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PROPERTY
I. EXPANSION OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED BY REAL ESTATE
BROKERS
In Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Lighthouse
Realty' the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Goolsby, expanded the scope of the fiduciary duty owed
by real estate brokers to sellers who have listed their property
with those brokers. In holding that a real estate broker owes a
fiduciary duty of full and prompt disclosure of material informa-
tion to his principal, the court of appeals has expanded the fidu-
ciary requirements to include the duty of timeliness. This ex-
pansion will enhance a seller's opportunity to obtain the highest
price for his property.
The Vacation Time controversy arose out of appellant
Lighthouse Realty's sale of respondent Vacation Time's prop-
erty. Vacation Time listed a parcel of property for sale, indicat-
ing that at least $300,000 must be realized from the deal.2 West-
wood Developers submitted a bid for $335,000, which, after
commissions were deducted, would net an amount of $300,000.
John Reed submitted an additional bid, that would have
amounted to a net of $306,000. 3 Unknown to Lowes, president of
Vacation Time, Reed was an officer of Lighthouse. Lowes had
set August 4, 1980, as the date by which he desired a contract.
On August 2, Lowes was contacted by Wilson, Lighthouse's
agent handling the Vacation Time account. Wilson pressed him
for a decision between the two offers. Lowes orally assented to
Reed's higher offer. The following day Greider, Westwood's
president, said that he would increase his offer by an amount
between $50,000 and $60,000.4 Wilson relayed neither this infor-
1. 286 S.C. 261, 332 S.E.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. Record at 64.
3. This was actually the second bid by these parties. An earlier bid resulted in each
party offering $335,000 for the property. Lighthouse instructed the parties to rebid, re-
sulting in the alleged impropriety that instigated this action. 286 S.C. at 264, 332 S.E.2d
at 783.
4. Record at 46-48.
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mation nor the fact that Reed was an officer of Lighthouse. He
merely submitted the Reed contract to Lowes. Lowes signed the
Reed contract on that same day.
On August 4, 1980, before submitting the contract to Wil-
son, Lowes learned of Reed's affiliation with Lighthouse. Lowes,
however, was not told of Greider's willingness to increase his of-
fer. The next day, Lowes delivered the signed contract to Wil-
son. Vacation Time subsequently brought an action against
Lighthouse for breach of its fiduciary duties as broker to act in
good faith and inform Vacation Time of all material facts con-
cerning the transaction. Claiming $150,000 in actual and puni-
tive damages, Vacation Time received a jury verdict of only
$50,000 in actual damages.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment as well as the
trial court's denial of Lighthouse's motions for nonsuit, directed
verdict, and judgment non obstante veredicto. In making its de-
termination, the court adopted a generally accepted principle of
agency: "It is the broker's duty to keep the principal fully in-
formed of all material facts which come to the broker's knowl-
edge with respect to the transaction in which he. is engaged and
which affect the principal's interest and might influence his ac-
tion, and the broker may be held liable in damages for his fail-
ure to disclose such information . . ."' This principle is well
established in South Carolina," but the Vacation Time court
added an additional requirement of "promptness."8 The court,
in fact, seemed to lessen the strict requirement of causation and
permitted any colorable effect of a failure to disclose material
facts in a timely manner that is inferable from the evidence
presented to be an actionable breach of fiduciary duty."
In other jurisdictions, the issue of a broker's breach of fidu-
ciary duty has most often arisen when raised as a defense to a
broker's action for his commission.10 In several cases brokers
have lost their licenses because the breach violated a specific
5. Id. at 77.
6. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 57, at 171 (1980).
7. See Lowrance v. Swaffield, 123 S.C. 331, 116 S.E. 278 (1923).
8. Compare id. with Vacation Time, 286 S.C. at 267-68, 332 S.E.2d at 785.
9. See 286 S.C. at 267-68, 332 S.E.2d at 785.
10. See Annotation, Liability of Real Estate Broker to Principal for Negligence in
Carrying Out Agency, 94 A.L.R.2D 468, 478 (1964).
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state real estate commission regulation.11 In Vacation Time
there was no allegation of any violation of real estate commis-
sion regulations. In fact, South Carolina regulations require only
that brokers tender all written offers to the seller.12 Neverthe-
less, the court found a common-law duty under agency princi-
ples" and, thus, expanded a broker's fiduciary duties under
South Carolina law. The broker must now inform the principal if
he knows that more advantageous terms could be obtained.1 4
The Vacation Time court did not address whether a broker
is an agent for an entire firm when he is ostensibly acting in his
own interests and the seller has another broker within the same
firm who acts on his behalf with regard to all transactions. The
failure to disclose Westwood's willingness to increase its offer
was the primary breach. 15 The court of appeals left open for fur-
ther interpretation whether, even if Westwood had not been
willing to increase its offer, a breach of fiduciary duty took place
because of the tardiness with which Lowes was informed of
Reed's status as officer of Lighthouse. 16
Vacation Time puts real estate brokers on notice that they
must make timely notifications of more advantageous offers,
whether oral or written. If they fail to do so, their liability seems
to be ex delicto, which normally includes the possibility of puni-
tive damages. Nevertheless, damages awarded will usually be
limited to those actually incurred: the deficit between the price
11. See, e.g., Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 169 P.2d 371 (1946); North Caro-
lina Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Gallman, 52 N.C. App. 118, 277 S.E.2d 853 (1981);
Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 308 S.E.2d 123 (1983).
12. S.C. Real Estate Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 105-19 (1976) provides
as follows: "A broker . . . shall promptly tender to the seller every written offer to
purchase obtained on the property involved . See 286 S.C. at 272, 332 S.E.2d at
787 (Gardner, J., concurring).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) requires an agent "to use rea-
sonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to
him and which... can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third
person. Comment d requires disclosure especially where the agent has adverse interests.
See also id. §§ 389, 391.
14. 286 S.C. at 268, 332 S.E.2d at 785; see 12 ALL JuR. 2D Brokers § 89 (1964).
15. 286 S.C. at 267-68, 332 S.E.2d at 785.
16. Lighthouse contended that the trial court should have instructed the jury that a
breach of fiduciary duty could be cured by disclosure. Brief of Appellant at 19. This may
be inferred from S.C. Real Estate Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 105-20 (1976),
which requires that an agent not acquire any interest from a listing owner without first
making his true position clearly known to that owner.
1986]
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that could have been received and what was actually received."
Future decisions must determine what constitutes "timely" no-
tice sufficient to fulfill the broker's fiduciary duty.
Gregory F. Litra
II. PROPERTY REGIME GIVEN STANDING TO SUE ON BEHALF OF
INDIVIDUAL OWNERS
In Dockside Association v. Detyens, Simmons and Car-
lisle'8 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a nonprofit
corporation that managed and maintained the common elements
of a condominium development did not have standing to bring
an action against a contractor on behalf of the condominium
unit owners. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in two recent
decisions, Roundtree Villas Association v. 4701 Kings Corp.19
and Queen's Grant Villas Horizontal Property Regimes I-V v.
Daniel International Corp.,20 also considered whether a condo-
minium association has standing to maintain such an action.
Dockside is consistent with the majority rule in jurisdictions
that do not provide a statutory right for a condominium owners'
organization to maintain an action in its own name for the bene-
fit of the co-owners of the condominium.2' The decision, how-
ever, has been overruled by the recent supreme court case of
Queen's Grant Villas, which reaffirmed the principles adopted
in Roundtree.22
Dockside Association was a nonprofit corporation that man-
aged and maintained the common elements of a condominium
development located in Charleston, South Carolina. Although
the common elements were owned by the unit owners pursuant
17. Lowrance v. Swafflield, 123 S.C. 331, 116 S.E. 278 (1923). The court of appeals
has subsequently limited recovery of punitive damages to "willful, wanton or reckless"
misconduct. Lengel v. Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc., 286 S.C. 515, 519-20, 334 S.E.2d 834,
837 (Ct. App. 1985).
18. 285 S.C. 565, 330 S.E.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1985).
19. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
20. 286 S.C. 555, 335 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
21. See, eog., Friendly Village Community Ass'n v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal.
App. 3d 220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973); Deal v. 999 Lakeshore Ass'n, 94 Nev. 301, 579
P.2d 775 (1978).
22. 286 S.C. at 556, 335 S.E.2d at 366.
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to the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act,2 3 Dockside
brought suit against McDevitt & Street, Inc., the prime contrac-
tor for the condominium project, on its own behalf and on be-
half of individual homeowners for damages caused to the com-
mon elements. In the circuit court proceedings, appellant
McDevitt & Street demurred to all causes of action. On appeal
from an order overruling the demurrers, the appellant con-
tended that Dockside lacked standing to maintain five of the
seven causes of action. The South Carolina Court of Appeals
agreed, reversing the circuit court judgment and dismissing the
action.
The court of appeals concluded that Dockside Association
did not have standing to bring the action since the association
was not considered to be the "real party in interest" pursuant to
section 15-5-70 of the South Carolina Code.25 Although the court
acknowledged that the association did have an interest in the
subject matter, the individual unit owners were considered to
have the "real" interest since they owned the common elements
of the property.26 The court noted that several states have al-
lowed standing, but pointed out that in those states, a statute
existed that expressly authorized the co-owner's organization to
maintain an action in its own name for the benefit of the co-
owners of the condominium. Since no similar statute exists in
23. This act, codified at South Carolina Code section 27-31-60, provides in pertinent
part:
An apartment owner shall have the exclusive ownership of his apartment
and shall have a common right to a shares with the other co-owners, in the
common elements of the property, equivalent to the percentage representing
the value of the individual apartment, with relation to the value of the whole
property.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-60 (1976).
24. The complaint alleged nine causes of action based on various tort and contract
remedies. Dockside Association was the plaintiff in the first seven causes of action and
the vice president and president of the Association were the plaintiffs in the last two
causes of action. 285 S.C. at 568, 330 S.E.2d at 539.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-70 (1976), repealed by 1985 S.C. AcTs 277, No. 100, § 2
(replaced by S.C.R. Civ. P. 17(a)) provides in pertinent part: "Every action must be pros-
ecuted in the name of the real party in interest except as otherwise provided in § 15-5-
8.,
26. 286 S.C. at 556, 335 S.E.2d at 366.
27. See, e.g., Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkbridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md.
693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 184 N.J. Super. 450, 446 A.2d
551 (1981); Towerhill Condominium Ass'n v. American Condominium Homes, Inc., 66
1986]
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South Carolina, the court concluded that Dockside lacked stand-
ing to sue the appellants.28
The respondents contended that they could maintain a class
action pursuant to section 15-5-50 of the South Carolina Code,29
even though no specific statute gives a co-owner's organization
standing to sue. The court determined, however, that the parties
in Dockside could not bring a class action because they were not
united in interest. The court also found that actions were
brought on damages sustained in individual apartments not in-
cluded within the condominium's common elements.3
In holding that a condominium association does not have
standing to maintain an action on behalf of the unit owners, the
Dockside court distinguished the South Carolina Supreme Court
decision of Roundtree Villas v. 4701 Kings Corp.31 In Roundtree
the supreme court held that a condominium association had
standing to maintain a cause of action relating to the condomin-
ium's common elements, but did not have standing to maintain
an action relating to condominium property that was not part of
the common elements. The court in Roundtree addressed the
standing issue and concluded that since the Roundtree Villas
Association "owned" the common elements, it was the proper
party to maintain the action. 2
In distinguishing Dockside from Roundtree, the court
pointed out that the Dockside Association merely managed and
maintained the common elements, but had no ownership rights
in the property.3 3 Although the distinction drawn by the court of
appeals appears to be valid, the rationale upon which it is based
raises some questions about the conclusions reached in Round-
tree Villas. The court states in Roundtree that "[t]he rights and
authority of the Regime must be gleaned from the Horizontal
Or. App. 342, 675 P.2d 1051 (1984); Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n Management Comm.
v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983).
28. 285 S.C. at 569, 330 S.E.2d at 539.
29. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-5-50 (1976), repealed by 1985 S.C. AcTs 277, No. 100, § 2
(replaced by S.C.R. Civ. P. 23(a)) provided: "When the question is one of a common or
general interest to many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it may be
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of the whole."
30. 285 S.C. at 572-73, 330 S.E.2d at 541. See generally S.C.R. Civ. P. 23(a).
31. 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
32. Id. at 421, 321 S.E.2d at 49.
33. 285 S.C. at 570, 330 S.E.2d at 540.
[Vol. 38
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Property Act and the master deed. '3 4 The pertinent portion of
the Horizontal Property Act states that the common areas are
owned on a pro rata basis by owners of the individual condomin-
ium units as tenants in common.3 5 Since this ownership right is
given to each unit owner by statute, the determination that the
corporation in Roundtree owns the common elements is incon-
sistent with the tenancy in common provided by law. In addi-
tion, the master deed in Roundtree states that the common ele-
ments are to be owned in common by all co-owners of the
condominium development.
3 6
If the co-owners, rather than the corporation, in Roundtree
owned the common elements by statutory right, the situations in
Roundtree and Dockside appear to be identical. Under the
court's reasoning in Dockside, if the corporation in Roundtree
had not owned the common elements, the corporation would not
have standing to maintain the action. This result would be con-
sistent with the real party in interest requirement mandated by
South Carolina statute37 as well as with the decisions of other
jurisdictions that have not amended their statutes to include
this specific right.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, recently reaf-
firmed the Roundtree decision by overruling Dockside in
Queen's Grant Horizontal Property Regimes I-V v. Daniel In-
ternational Corp.3 8 The court held in Queen's Grant that a
property regime does have standing to bring an action for con-
struction defects in the common elements which that regime has
the duty to maintain.39 By its ruling in Queen's Grant, the su-
preme court follows a minority of jurisdictions that have allowed
an association to maintain standing solely as the representative
of its members even absent a statute granting the right as a mat-
ter of law. 0
34. 282 S.C. at 418, 321 S.E.2d at 49.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-31-60 (1976).
36. Record at 741.
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-70 (1976).
38. 286 S.C. 555, 335 S.E.2d 365 (1985). The Supreme Court of South Carolina later
reversed the court of appeals decision in Dockside by holding that a property regime
does have standing to bring an action for construction defects in common elements that
the regime has a duty to maintain. In reversing the decision, the supreme court cited
both Queen's Grant and Roundtree. 287 S.C. 287, 337 S.E.2d 887.
39. 286 S.C. at 556, 335 S.E.2d at 366.
40. See, e.g., 1000 Grandview Ass'n v. Mt. Washington Assocs., 290 Pa. Super. 365,
1986]
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By overruling Dockside, the South Carolina Supreme Court
has elected to employ general principles of standing to
predominate in this confusing area of condominium law. Al-
though the decision reflects a minority position, the court ap-
pears to have adopted a practical approach based on sound pol-
icy arguments. Because many owners of condominiums located
along the South Carolina coast reside out of state and because of
the recent popularity of condominium time-sharing plans, class
actions to recover damages for defects to the common elements
would be impracticable." Since the association has the obliga-
tion to maintain and manage the common elements, they are the
appropriate party to seek recovery for construction defects to
the common elements. Therefore, although technical difficulties
with the principle remain, the South Carolina Supreme Court
appears to have chosen a practical solution to a complicated
problem.
Kelly E. Shackelford
III. NEW STANDARD SET FOR REVIEW OF DEEDS
The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently set a stan-
dard to review the adequacy of deed descriptions when deter-
mining the validity of a deed as evidence of title. In Bryan v.
Bryan42 the court held that a deed, in order to be effective as
evidence of title, must either in terms or by reference to another
designation give a description of the subject matter intended to
be conveyed that will be sufficient to identify the property with
reasonable certainty.
43
434 A.2d 796 (1981). In 1000 Grandview Association the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
employed the principles enunciated in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), to hold that
the association had representational standing to assert the rights of its individual mem-
bers. 290 Pa. Super. at 366, 434 A.2d at 797. Finding precedent from other jurisdictions
to be unpersuasive, the court based its holding on "the general principles of standing"
which allow a representational action if an immediate, direct, and substantial injury is
alleged to any member of the group. Id. at 367, 434 A.2d at 797. Since damage to the
common elements was held to have met these injury requirements, the association was
permitted to assert standing. Id.
41. Queen's Grant Villas, located in Hilton Head, South Carolina, would be an ex-
ample of a condominium complex that would find a class action to be impracticable.
42. 285 S.C. 434, 330 S.E.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1985).
43. 285 S.C. at 437, 330 S.E.2d at 312 (quoting Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty, 112
[Vol. 38
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Bryan arose as an action to quiet title. Respondent Wilma
J. Bryan claimed ownership of a thirty-acre tract against her ex-
husband's son. Wilma Bryan's title originated in a 1947 tax deed
to Lillian Christensen. The property, described in the tax deed
in terms of adjacent land, was surveyed in 1947 and found to
contain thirty acres. The deed was recorded in 1956, and Chris-
tensen's heir granted the parcel of land to Mrs. Bryan in 1957.
The son, the appellant in this action, claimed title pursuant
to a deed of ten acres from his father, John Daniel Bryan. John
Bryan acquired the "Rina Smalls tract" through a tax deed. The
deed described the tract as south of the adjacent tract of Wilma
Bryan; the description did not include any indication of acreage,
metes, or references to an existing plat.
Upon their divorce in 1979, John Bryan agreed to convey to
Wilma his interest in the Christensen tract. In the same year,
however, a survey of John Bryan's plat indicated that the south-
ern ten acres of the Christensen tract were, in fact, the Rina
Smalls tract. John Bryan's belief that he had retained the south-
ern portion of the property after the divorce led to this conflict
over the ten acres.
The court of appeals upheld the special referee's finding
that the tax deed description of the property purchased by Mr.
Bryan in 1967 was "so vague" that it was not shown to be a part
of the subject property in Wilma Bryan's action to quiet title.44
The court restated two basic propositions of South Carolina law
in support of its ruling. First, it pronounced that an appellate
body should not disturb factual findings of the referee where
there is evidence which reasonably supports the findings.45 Sec-
ond, the court reaffirmed the principle that an action in equity is
the appropriate method of quieting title.46
On appeal Mr. Bryan had contended that the circuit court,
by disallowing the purported conveyance, read the entire Rina
Smalls tract out of existence.47 The respondent disagreed, argu-
ing that it was the ownership, not the existence of the tract,
Va. 649, 72 S.E. 112 (1911)).
44. 285 S.C. at 436, 330 S.E.2d at 311.
45. Townes Assocs. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976); accord
Metze v. Meetze, 231 S.C. 154, 97 S.E.2d 514 (1957); Knight v. Hilton, 224 S.C. 452, 79
S.E.2d 871 (1954).
46. Van Every v. Chinquapin Hollow, Inc., 265 S.C. 474, 219 S.E.2d 909 (1975).
47. Brief of Appellant at 5.
1986]
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which was in question. The respondent contended that such a
determination was factual in nature and had been decided by
the trial court on the basis of ample evidentiary support.48 The
court of appeals agreed with the respondent, restating several
concerns of the referee. The court noted that the sheriff, at the
tax sale, had told the appellant that the location of the Rina
Smalls tract was unknown. The court also noted that Mr. Bryan
admitted his ignorance of the tract's existence, although he
thought it adjoined the Christensen tract. The court pointed out
that at no time prior to the divorce did Mr. Bryan claim any
interest in the southernmost ten acres of Mrs. Bryan's tract, nor
did he make any pretense to exclude those ten acres when he
deeded his interest in Wilma's property pursuant to the divorce
decree.49 Finally, the court found that Mr. Bryan's evidence was
sketchy, since his surveyor admitted that he had not researched
the title to the property south of the Christensen tract,50 and his
equation of the Rina Smalls tract with the southernmost ten
acres of the Christensen tract was "just an opinion." 51 Thus, the
court affirmed the evidentiary conclusion reached by the lower
court.52
The rule of the case, that a deed description must identify
the subject property with sufficient certainty, is in accord with
general South Carolina law. A case not cited by the court, Brun-
son v. Graham,5 3 reflects this contention: where there is "no
competent evidence whatsoever of any probative value as to the
location of the ... boundaries" of disputed property, a trial
court's decree of ownership is not objectionable without sugges-
tion of inequity.5 4 In Bryan the court ruling was an adoption of
a general principle of Virginia common law.55 While South Caro-
48. Brief of Respondent at 7.
49. 285 S.C. at 438, 330 S.E.2d at 312.
50. Id.
51. Record at 118.
52. It is interesting to note that the court did not rule on the issue of adverse pos-
session by Wilma Bryan, although this issue was addressed by both parties in their
briefs. See Brief of Appellant at 4; Brief of Respondent at 7. The court determined that
since proper title rested in Mrs. Bryan as a matter of law, there was no need to address
that question. 285 S.C. at 439, 330 S.E.2d at 312.
53. 259 S.C. 298, 191 S.E.2d 713 (1972).
54. Id. at 299, 191 S.E.2d at 714.
55. Harris v. Scott, 179 Va. 102, 18 S.E.2d 305 (1942); Whealton & Wisherd v.
Doughty, 112 Va. 649, 72 S.E. 112 (1911).
[Vol. 38
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lina has put claimants on the same footing when they do not
claim title from a common source,56 this rule does not apply un-
til one shows to the satisfaction of the trial court that the land
claimed is what was conveyed. Hence, the rule was inapplicable
in Bryan.
The precedential effect of Bryan is to expand the meaning
of Coleman v. Gaskins.5 7 In Coleman, as in Bryan, the plaintiff
brought suit to remove a cloud from his title. Bryan adds a co-
rollary to Coleman in its ruling that a defendant in such an ac-
tion cannot refute a claim of title with a sufficiently vague
description. The court's limitation on vagueness, however, does
not disallow the use of the listing of adjacent tracts as a method
of description.
5 8
There are two practical consequences of Bryan. First, the
decision alerts drafters of deeds that they must give a particular
and accurate description of conveyed property, especially when
the description is in the form of adjoining lands. Second, it
brings South Carolina into line with the general rule of most ju-
risdictions that "[a] purported conveyance is not one in fact un-
less it contains a description from which a competent person can
locate the land intended to be conveyed and can distinguish it
from all other land. '
59
Gregory F. Litra
IV. UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE EXECUTION OF A WILL
In In re Last Will & Testament of Smoak60 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the contestant of a will had not
presented sufficient evidence to submit the question of undue
influence to the jury.61 The court concluded that since no rea-
sonable inference of undue influence existed, the executor's mo-
tion for directed verdict should have been granted by the lower
56. Dickson v. Epps, 104 S.C. 381, 89 S.E. 354 (1916).
57. 165 S.C. 301, 163 S.E. 790 (1932).
58. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.2, at
725 (1984). There is, however, no particular South Carolina rule of decision on this point.
59. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.34 (1954).
60. 286 S.C. 419, 334 S.E.2d 806 (1985).
61. Id. at 428, 334 S.E.2d at 811.
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court.6 2 Although the court's holding in Smoak is typical of the
recent decisions that have addressed this issue, the distinctions
drawn by the court are tenuous. The court failed to set forth any
clear-cut standard to determine whether undue influence had
been exercised in the execution of a will.
In May 1979, when Mr. Smoak's wife died, he executed a
will giving one-third of his estate to his niece Janette Martin,
one-third to his niece Aubrea Westervelt, and one-third to his
niece by marriage, Dorothy Smoak. Shortly after the execution
of the will, because of his deteriorating health, Mr. Smoak
moved into the home of Mrs. Martin and her husband. He then
executed a power of attorney in favor of Mrs. Martin. In October
1979, just five months after the original will had been executed,
Mrs. Martin had her own attorney draw a new will. Under the
terms of this will, one-third of the estate went to Mrs. Martin
and her husband, one-third to Aubrea Westervelt, and one-third
to the children of Mrs. Westervelt. A $2000 dollar bequest was
made to Dorothy Smoak."3 When Mr. Smoak died fourteen
months later, Dorothy Smoak contested the will contending that
Janette Martin had exerted undue influence over Mr. Smoak in
the execution of the new will.
In deciding whether a factual determination was required
and whether the issue should be presented to the jury, the lower
court considered the testimony of Dr. William Woodward, a psy-
chiatrist and geriatric medical doctor who had ministered to Mr.
Smoak's needs. Dr. Woodward testified that, in his opinion, Ja-
nette Martin had "impressed her will" upon Mr. Smoak and
that the new will was the result of that influence. 4 The doctor's
testimony caused the trial judge to submit the issue of undue
influence to the jury.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision, rea-
soning that the burden on the contestants to prove undue influ-
ence had not been met. The court determined that the influence
extended over Mr. Smoak was not so strong that it dominated
62. Id.
63. The new will changed the old one by providing that Mrs. Martin share her one-
third with her husband, giving one-third to the children of Mrs. Westervelt, and reduc-
ing Dorothy Smoak's share from one-third to a $2000 bequest. Id. at 422, 334 S.E.2d at
808.
64. Id. at 426, 334 S.E.2d at 810.
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his will and prevented the exercise of his judgment and choice."
The court acknowledged the testimony of Dr. Woodward, but
concluded that his expert opinion testimony had no probative
value since it related only to undue influence and not to the
mental capacity of Mr. Smoak.6
In reaching its decision, the supreme court analyzed several
recent South Carolina decisions that had addressed the issue of
undue influence in the execution of a will. The court first noted
the general rule set forth in Calhoun v. Calhoun67 that a mere
showing of opportunity and motive to exercise undue influence
does not justify a submission of that issue to the jury. In Cal-
houn the chief beneficiary of the will was accused of exercising
undue influence over her father because of his weakened physi-
cal condition at the time the will was rewritten. The court con-
sidered three issues in its determination that no factual issue
existed. First, the Calhoun court noted that the testator's physi-
cian had testified that the testator was oriented as to time,
place, and situation. Second, it emphasized that the alleged ex-
erter of undue influence was not present during the testator's
conferences with the attorney or during the execution of the will.
Last, the court relied on the testator's "unhampered opportunity
to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of any undue in-
fluence upon him." 65
Although similarities between these two cases exist, the
65. Id. at 424-27, 334 S.E.2d at 809-10.
66. The testimony to which the judge referred was as follows:
Q: Dr. Woodward, having known and treated Holly Smoak for the number of
years which you treated him, having known him also intimately and his family,
do you have an opinion as to whether or not his will and free control was di-
minished during the period that he stayed in the home of Janette Martin?
A: I do.
Q: And what is that opinion?
A: I think that - that he was taken over by Janette Martin, and I think that
she impressed her will upon Mr. Smoak.
Q: Knowing Mr. Smoak and knowing the objects of his affection, do you be-
lieve that the Will executed on October 11, 1979, was the result of - do you
have a medical opinion to a reasonable medical certainty as to whether or not
this Will was the result of any undue influence?
A: I think so.
286 S.C. at 426-27, 334 S.E.2d at 810. The court also considered the fact that Dr. Wood-
ward was angry with Mrs. Martin for having discharged him because of a disagreement
over the sale of the testator's farm to the doctor. Id. at 427, 334 S.E.2d at 810.
67. 277 S.C. 527, 290 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
68. Id. at 533, 290 S.E.2d at 419.
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facts in Smoak differ significantly from those in Calhoun. In
Smoak the testator's physician testified that Mr. Smoak had
been influenced by Mrs. Martin in the execution of the will.
Mrs. Martin also called upon her own attorney to draft the Oc-
tober will and the testimony suggested that she may have, in
fact, dictated that will.69 Additionally, the time period allowed
to revoke the will subsequent to the undue influence in Calhoun
was longer than the time period in the present case."
After comparing the instant case to Calhoun, the supreme
court in Smoak distinguished the case from Byrd v. Byrd. 7 ' In
Byrd the court held that the evidence of undue influence was
sufficient to submit the issue to the jury. The court reasoned
that undue influence was evidenced by the continuing threats of
the principal beneficiary, the son, to place the testator in a nurs-
ing home, the heavy medication of the testator, the restricted
communication allowed between the testator and members of
his immediate family, and the fiduciary relationship that existed
between the son and the testator. The similarities in Byrd and
Smoak are obvious. In each case the testator had a weakened
medical condition testified to by an expert witness, the testator
was allegedly restricted from communicating with other mem-
bers of his family, and the person allegedly exerting undue influ-
ence stood in a fiduciary relationship. 2
The court distinguished the instant case from Byrd by not-
ing that Mr. Smoak had remained mentally alert throughout his
illness even though the testimony of Dr. Woodward indicated
otherwise. The court further noted that the person who allegedly
exerted undue influence was not benefiting financially from the
change in the will. The court concluded its reasoning by discred-
iting the expert opinion testimony of Dr. Woodward.73 The dis-
69. This fact is suggested in Justice Gregory's dissenting opinion. The opinion also
points out that the attorney who drafted the October will was never called to testify and
that his testimony would have been dispositive on the issues at trial. 286 S.C. at 430, 334
S.E.2d at 812 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
70. In Calhoun the testator had three years to revoke his will subsequent to the
alleged undue influence. 227 S.C. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 417. In Smoak the time period
was 14 months. 286 S.C. at 426, 334 S.E.2d at 810.
71. 279 S.C. 425, 308 S.E.2d 788 (1983).
72. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gregory pointed out that Mrs. Martin was in a
fiduciary relationship with the decedent. 286 S.C. at 431, 334 S.E.2d at 813 (Gregory, J.,
dissenting). This relationship was not discussed in the majority opinion.
73. 286 S.C. at 427, 334 S.E.2d at 810-11.
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tinctions made by the court, however, do not indicate a clear
absence of a factual issue. Even though Dr. Woodward testified
as to his opinion on undue influence rather than mental capac-
ity, he was still the personal physician and friend of the testator
and was aware of the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will. It is also clear that although Mrs. Martin did not
benefit financially from the October will, she may have benefited
indirectly from the exclusion of Dorothy Smoak.
Even if the supreme court was correct in deciding that no
reasonable inference of undue influence existed, the opinion fails
to set forth any clear-cut standards that would aid the practi-
tioner in protecting against undue influence. Instead, the deci-
sion demands a constant weighing of facts and circumstances.
Because it failed to denote guidelines by which a trial judge can
decide whether the issue of undue influence should be submitted
to the jury, the supreme court has left a great deal of discretion
in the hands of trial courts, which may lead to incnsistent
results.
Kelly E. Shackelford
V. STANDARD BY WHICH TO IMPLY CONSTRUcTIVE KNOWLEDGE
OF TERMS OF RECORDED DOCUMENTS
In Reid v. Harbison Development Corp.7 4 the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals ruled that constructive notice of recorded
documents would not be imputed to a defrauded buyer where
the facts support a jury finding that the buyer acted with rea-
sonable prudence in relying upon the representations of the
seller. 5 This decision aligns South Carolina with the majority of
jurisdictions that have ruled on the question.
The conflict between the parties arose from the sale of resi-
dential property to the plaintiffs, the Reids, by defendant
Harbison Development Corporation. 6 During negotiations a
Harbison agent told the plaintiffs that Harbison would be re-
sponsible for the development and maintenance of a pond lo-
74. 285 S.C. 557, 330 S.E.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1985).
75. Id. at 562, 330 S.E.2d at 535.
76. Since Coogler was involved in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of this trial,
the action proceeded against Harbison alone. Id. at 558, 330 S.E.2d at 533.
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cated on the property. Pursuant to Harbison's policy of selling
lots to builders rather than homeowners, plaintiffs entered into a
contract with Coogler, a builder, on April 29, 1979, to purchase
the lot from him and have him construct the house.
The deed that Harbison then transferred to Coogler con-
tained restrictive covenants concerning the mandatory member-
ship in the homeowners' association and the maintenance of the
pond. The deed was recorded on June 8, 1979. On July 26, 1979,
Harbison and Coogler signed a "Declaration of Covenants" plac-
ing further restrictions on the property. The declaration was re-
corded on July 27, 1979, the day of the closing."7 During the
closing the existence of the homeowners' association was men-
tioned, but the Reids were assured that membership would be
optional. A year after the sale, the Reids were informed that
membership in the association was mandatory and that they
were financially responsible for their share of the maintenance of
the pond."8
Plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages on a theory of
common-law fraud and deceit.79 The jury found in favor of the
plaintiffs, and defendants' motions for judgment non obstante
veredicto and new trial were denied.80
On appeal defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to prove
that they were ignorant of the falsity of the representation or
that they had a right to rely on the representation. Defendants
contended that constructive notice was imputed to the buyers
because the deed containing the restrictive covenants was
recorded.8 1
In rejecting the defendants' arguments, the court of appeals
based its opinion on the majority rule concerning fraudulent
77. Id. at 559, 330 S.E.2d at 533-34.
78. Id. at 559-60, 330 S.E.2d at 534.
79. Plaintiffs brought suit on three other theories as follows: (1) breach of contract
accompanied by fraudulent acts; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) violation of the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. 285 S.C. at 560, 330 S.E.2d at 534. Harbison
was granted directed verdicts on the first two theories by the trial court. The unfair
trade practice theory was submitted to the jury which found in favor of plaintiffs. This
theory was not addressed by the appellate court. Id.
80. The jury awarded plaintiffs $20,000 actual damages and $20,000 punitive dam-
ages. On appeal Harbison contended that the verdict was excessive and not supported by
the evidence. The court of appeals upheld the award of punitive damages and remanded
the iesue of actual damages. 285 S.C. at 557, 330 S.E.2d at 532.
81. Brief of Appellant at 11.
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misrepresentations. s2 First, the court found that at the time the
representation was made no covenants regarding the pond had
been recorded. Second, the court recognized that the buyers
were laymen and would have needed expert assistance to investi-
gate the records to obtain the truth. Last, the court found that
the defendants induced the buyers to accept the title in spite of
the recorded documents by additional representations made at
the closing.8 3
Based on these findings, the court held that the jury could
reasonably have concluded that plaintiffs, had proved the neces-
sary elements of fraud. s Additionally, the court held that since
the jury found that the defrauded parties acted with reasonable
prudence, constructive notice would not be imputed to them."
Although the court based its decision on the majority rule
concerning fraudulent misrepresentation, the court appears to
apply established principles regarding fraud in South Carolina
to the specific issue of whether constructive notice may be im-
puted to a buyer to defeat a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
82. 285 S.C. at 561, 330 S.E.2d at 534-35. The rule cited by the Reid court states:
Where the fact misrepresented or the matters which are concealed are pe-
culiarly within the representor's knowledge and the representee is ignorant
thereof, it is generally held that, although the real fact appears on the public
records, the representee is under no obligation to examine the records, and his
failure to do so does not defeat his right of action. This is especially true where
the very representations relied on induced the hearer to refrain from an exami-
nation of the records, where the employment of an expert would have been
required to deduce the truth from an examination of the records, where confi-
dential relations existed, or where the defrauded party was inexperienced. In
such cases the doctrine of constructive notice is inapplicable.
The true test of the hearer's right to rely on misrepresentations as to mat-
ters of record is whether or not he acted with reasonable prudence in his
reliance.
Id. (quoting 31 C.J.S. Fraud § 34c (1943)).
Generally, the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation has a right to rely even
though he might have ascertained the truth upon investigation. Tallevast v. Herzog, 225
S.C. 563, 83 S.E.2d 204 (1954).
A person committing fraud cannot defeat a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
solely on the basis that defrauded person had constructive notice. See Citizens Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill. App. 2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612 (1966); First Nat'l Bank v.
Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); Cowles v. Johnson, 297 Ky. 454, 179 S.W.2d 674
(1944); Brandt v. Olympic Constr., Inc., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 913, 449 N.E.2d 1231 (1983);
Heverly v. Kirkendall, 257 Or. 232, 478 P.2d 381 (1970).
83. 285 S.C. at 561-62, 330 S.E.2d at 535.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 562, 330 S.E.2d at 535.
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In Thomas v. American Workmen86 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court noted that while the policy of the courts is to sup-
press fraud and discourage negligence, the "unmistakable drift is
toward the just doctrine that a wrongdoer cannot shield himself
from liability by asking the law to condemn the credulity of the
ignorant and unwary.181 The court declined to adopt a strict rule
prohibiting the party making the misrepresentations from de-
feating the claim by showing that the defrauded party could
have ascertained the truth upon investigation.8 8 The determina-
tive issue in each case is whether the defrauded party acted with
reasonable diligence. In Thomas the court noted that determina-
tion of reasonable diligence "will depend upon the various cir-
cumstances involved such as the form and materiality of the
representations, the respective intelligence, experience, age, and
mental and physical condition of the parties, and the relation
and respective knowledge and means of knowledge of the
parties." 89
In Tallevast v. Herzog9" the supreme court noted that the
issue of reasonable reliance by the defrauded party was a proper
issue for the jury. In addition, the court held that when the facts
of the misrepresentation are peculiarly within the seller's knowl-
edge, the buyer usually has a right to rely on the representation
and is not precluded from asserting a claim even though he
failed to investigate the facts.9 1 The principles established in
these cases support the holding in Reid. The courts accomplish
the policy of suppressing fraud by prohibiting the wrongdoer
from defeating the claim solely on the basis of constructive
knowledge.
The jury in Reid determined that the reliance was reasona-
bly based on the circumstances.2 Since the first covenant was
not recorded when the contract was executed and the second
declaration was not recorded until the day of the closing, the
facts were found to be peculiarly within the seller's knowledge.
Furthermore, the seller induced the buyer to accept title by ad-
86. 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886 (1941).
87. Id. at 182, 14 S.E.2d at 887.
88. 285 S.C. at 560-61, 330 S.E.2d at 534-35.
89. 197 S.C. at 182, 14 S.E.2d at 888.
90. 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E.2d 204 (1954).
91. Id. at 570, 83 S.E.2d at 207.
92. 285 S.C. at 562, 330 S.E.2d at 535.
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ditional misrepresentations. Finally, the specific relation of the
buyers to Harbison was as initial purchasers. The buyers' knowl-
edge was merely laymen's knowledge. On the other hand, the
sellers were agents with superior knowledge. Thus, the holding
in Reid appears to be in accordance with established principles
regarding common-law fraud in South Carolina.
Although the court did not specifically discuss a purchaser's
duty to investigate recorded documents, it appears that this
duty has remained unchanged. The purpose of the recording
statutes is to protect subsequent purchasers and creditors.
9 3
Consequently, several South Carolina cases have held that con-
structive knowledge of recorded instruments affecting the chain
of title is imputed to the purchaser.94 None of these cases, how-
ever, involved fraudulent misrepresentations by the seller.
Reid does not change a purchaser's duty to investigate pub-
lic records. It holds only that a claim for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation cannot be defeated solely on the grounds that the pur-
chaser failed to fulfill this duty. 5 Therefore, when a claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation is involved, the crucial issue be-
comes whether the reliance on the representations was reasona-
ble. The purchaser's failure to investigate the record will be a
major consideration in making this determination. Thus, when
the jury determines that the person defrauded acted with rea-
sonable prudence and takes various circumstances into consider-
ation, including the purchaser's failure to investigate the record,
constructive knowledge will not be imputed to defeat a claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation.
Virginia Ann Mullikin
VI. STANDARD OF ACQUIESCENCE IN BOUNDARY DISPUTES
In Kirkland v. Gross 6 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed a circuit court's resolution of a boundary dispute. In
93. Epps v. McCallum Realty Co., 139 S.C. 481, 138 S.E. 297 (1927).
94. Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 217 S.E.2d 16 (1975); First Presbyte-
rian Church v. York Depository, 203 S.C. 410, 27 S.E.2d 573 (1943); Moyle v. Campbell,
126 S.C. 180, 119 S.E. 186 (1923).
95. 285 S.C. at 561, 330 S.E.2d at 534.
96. 286 S.C. 193, 332 S.E.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1985).
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reaching its decision, the court addressed three classic property
issues: resurvey, acquiescence, and adverse possession. Although
the court's reasoning concerning adverse possession97 and resur-
vey9e follows well-established rules, its treatment of the acquies-
cence issue raises several questions.
The appellants brought this action, inter alia, to determine
their property line.99 The conflict arose when Gross, the adjoin-
ing landowner and respondent in the action, cut and sold timber
in an area claimed by Kirkland and other heirs of J. F. Carter.
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined events in the
1950s to determine whether the parties' predecessors-in-title had
acquiesced in settling a similar boundary dispute.
In the 1950s, Nummy, the respondent's predecessor-in-title,
hired a surveyor to establish the boundary and cut timber in
accordance with this line. Carter, the appellant's predecessor-in-
title, became dissatisfied with the line drawn and complained to
Nummy. On Nummy's advice, Carter hired her own surveyor
who reached a different conclusion more favorable to the Carter
tract. After Carter's surveyor established the second line,
Nummy moved his fence out of the disputed area and paid
Carter $250 for the timber he had cut there.100
The court, however, concluded that Nummy had no inten-
tion of establishing a new property line. The court pointed to
testimony in which Nummy asserted that he had paid Carter
only to pacify her and had moved his fence, not to establish a
97. In dealing with adverse possession, the court reaffirmed the well-established
South Carolina standard that to be adverse, possession must be actual, open, notorious,
exclusive, hostile, continuous, and uninterrupted. Id. at 198, 332 S.E.2d at 549 (citing
King v. Hawkins, 282 S.C. 508, 319 S.E.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1984)). In support of its conclu-
sion that adverse possession had not been established, the court pointed to Kirkland's
testimony that her family had never used the disputed property or cut timber from it.
98. Although the court dealt with several aspects of resurvey for the first time, its
conclusion is similar to that of an overwhelming majority of states that have dealt with
the issue. The court cited 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 61 (1938) and 12 AM. JuR. 2D Bounda-
ries § 61 (1964) for the following propositions: When lines of a senior and junior survey
conflict, the lines of the senior survey control; and a resurveyor's duty is to relocate the
courses and lines at the same place where originally located by the first surveyor and not
to dispute the correctness of the original survey.
99. The appellants were also seeking damages for timber sold by the respondents
and an injunction prohibiting the respondents from using a certain road. 286 S.C. at 195,
332 S.E.2d at 547.
100. Brief of Appellant at 6.
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different boundary, but to enclose his cows. 101 Based on this tes-
timony, the Kirkland court affirmed the trial court's finding of
lack of acquiescence.
In concluding that no acquiescence existed, the court relied
heavily on Croft v. Sanders0 2 for the propositions that the mere
existence of a fence between adjoining properties is not, in itself,
sufficient to establish a boundary by acquiescence and that
fences may be erected for purposes having nothing to do with
establishing boundaries. 10 3 Although these propositions were ap-
plicable in Croft,'0 4 an important distinction makes their appli-
cability questionable in Kirkland: Nummy paid Carter for tim-
ber he cut in the area she claimed and, at her insistence,
removed his fence from the disputed area. These actions logi-
caly gave Carter valid reason to believe that Nummy had acqui-
esced to the line her surveyor had drawn.
In Croft, however, Croft took no action that would have rea-
sonably led Sanders to believe a new boundary had been cre-
ated. 0 5 The Croft court, sensing this very problem, specifically
noted that "acquiescence depends upon the particular facts of
the case. Generally, the question turns on 'the acts or declara-
tions of the parties . . ., on inferences or presumptions from
their conduct, or on their silence.' ",,o
Therefore, a strong inference of acquiescence can be drawn
from Nummy's conduct since payment for timber cut in a dis-
puted area and removal of a fence from the area are not acts
that indicate Nummy's claim to full, undisputed possession.
Even if Nummy's conduct had been insufficient to infer acquies-
cence, his silence after moving the fence at Carter's insistence
101. 286 S.C. at 193, 332 S.E.2d at 548.
102. 283 S.C. 507, 323 S.E.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1984).
103. Id. at 510, 323 S.E.2d at 793.
104. Croft involved a similar dispute with the plaintiff asserting acquiescence and
adverse possession to determine the boundary. The Croft court resolved both issues in
the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 510-12, 323 S.E.2d at 793-94.
105. Sanders pointed to two acts by Croft indicating acquiescence to a new bound-
ary: constructing a fence and hammering a galvanized pipe into the ground. The fence,
however, was constructed in 1950 in order to obtain a farm loan and no testimony indi-
cated otherwise. The galvanized pipe was used by Croft in order to serve as a point from
which he could be certain the right-of-way granted him would lead to his property: Evi-
dence existed that Sanders specifically knew the purpose of this pipe. Id. at 510, 323
S.E.2d at 793.
106. Id. at 509-10, 323 S.E.2d at 793 (citation omitted)(quoting 11 C.J.S. Bounda-
ries § 79 (1938)).
1986] 195
21
Litra et al.: Property
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
gave Carter valid reason to believe Nummy had waived or aban-
doned any rights.117 For these reasons, the court's treatment of
acquiescence may have ignored an important aspect of the issue.
The court's conclusion also raises interesting policy ques-
tions concerning the weight given to secret intent. Although
Nummy testified that he "really didn't accept anything" when
he moved his fence, he testified at another point that he claimed
only up to his fence, recognizing the land across the fence as the
Carter property.108 In Kirkland Nummy's questionable intent il-
lustrates an inherent problem with such testimony: intent, while
easy to state, is difficult to disprove-especially after the passage
of thirty years. Here, Nummy's secret intent, although balanced
against express acts and thirty years of silence, controlled and
decided the issue.109 The preferential weight clearly given to this
testimony, even though inconsistent and weighted against objec-
tive acts, could raise problems in the resolution of future
disputes.
Joseph Calhoun Watson
107. See Olson v. Clark, 252 Iowa 1133, 109 N.W.2d 441 (1961). The court dealt with
this issue, stating as follows:
Acquiescence which will establish a boundary line is consent inferred from si-
lence, a tacit encouragement involving notice or knowledge of the other parties'
claim; it exists when a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a
transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for a length of time that under
the circumstances the other party may fairly infer he has waived or abandoned
his right.
Id. at 1138, 109 N.W.2d at 444.
108. Master's Transcript at 229-30. The relevant testimony is as follows:
Q. And you moved your fence to a point, let's say as close as you can eyeball it
into where the line was to be?
A. That is correct.
Q. And from that point forward, you claimed just up to the fence?
A. That's right.
Q. And everything on the other side of the fence would have been Mrs. Carter's
or the Carter property?
A. Yes.
109. 286 S.C. at 198, 332 S.E.2d at 549.
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